Against Grue Mysteries - a podcast by MCMP Team

Alexandra Zinke (Konstanz) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (28 May, 2015) titled "Against Grue Mysteries". Abstract: In a recent paper, Freitag (2015) reduces Goodman’s new riddle of induction to the problem of doxastic dependence. We are not justified in projecting grue because our grue-evidence is doxastically dependent on defeated evidence. I try to implement this solution into an inductive extension of AGM belief revision theory. It turns out that the grue-example is nothing but an inductive version of well-known examples by Hansson (1992), which he uses to argue for base revision: If revision takes place on belief-bases, rather than on logically closed belief sets, we can easily account for the doxasticdependence relations between our beliefs. To handle the grue-case, I introduce the notion of an inductively closed belief-base. If we update on this inductively closed belief-base, the grue problem dissolves.

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